Yeti: First Experiments

Yeti Workshop

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



Yeti Experiment Protocol

- 1. Proposal
- 2. Lab Test
- 3. Yeti Test
- 4. Report of Findings











Yeti DM Synchronization



Git synchronized directory:

yeti-root-servers.yaml
iana-start-serial.txt
yeti-root-ksk.key
yeti-root-ksk.private
yeti-root-zsk.key
yeti-root-zsk.private

YAML has server name, IP, NOTIFY and XFR addresses.





Yeti Zone Generation

- 1. The SOA is updated:
 - The MNAME and RNAME are set to Yeti values
- 2. The IANA DNSSEC information is removed:
 - The DNSKEY records
 - The RRSIG and NSEC records
- 3. The IANA root server records are removed:
 - The NS records for [A-M].ROOT-SERVERS.NET

- 4. The Yeti DNSSEC information is added:
 - The DNSKEY records
- 5. The Yeti root server records are added:
 - The NS records
 - The AAAA glue records
- 6. The Yeti root zone is (re-)signed





Multi-ZSK: Motivation


- Currently one KSK, one ZSK
- KSK and ZSK shared by all 3 DM
- Increases required shared secrets
 - No split like IANA/Verisign roles
- Separate ZSK increases DM independence





Multi-ZSK: Lab Test

- Single KSK
- Root A & B have separate ZSK
- Resolver uses hints file with only Root A & B
- BIND 9 and Unbound resolvers







Multi-ZSK: Experiment

- Turn off Root B
- Let Resolver perform priming queries
- Query signed TLD
 - This should validate
- Turn off Root A, turn on Root B
- Query another signed TLD
 - This should validate





Multi-ZSK: Test Cases

- 1. Two ZSK, not shared
- 2. Two ZSK, shared by both servers
- 3. Root A rolls to new ZSK using pre-publish
- 4. Root A rolls to new ZSK using double signature rollover





Multi-ZSK: Results

- 1. Two ZSK, not shared
 - SERVFAIL
- 2. Two ZSK, shared by both servers
 - NOERROR
- 3. Root A rolls to new ZSK using pre-publish
 - NOERROR
- 4. Root A rolls to new ZSK using double signature rollover
 - NOERROR





Multi-ZSK: Example Response



```
; <<>> DiG 9.10.2-P3 <<>> @240c:f:1:122::99 . dnskey +dnssec +multi
  ANSWER SECTION:
                        86395 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 (
                                AwEAActs8YXonx5o6KavhZGh9nWkhcKMDacREsMkNxLP
                                W6jSkntGYWDMOwdMXLStiukjWhkcvyxbnI8o0ga050xC
                                GzVHnFzcJc5+mHtfa0+ZMfZxmeeun2mMl7iz3RySnAZI
                                bzfdupJAQ2wKmiw2pvqb3fmusovUfpMDmkbYBArWZyhv
                                ); ZSK; alg = RSASHA1; key id = 50688
                        86395 IN DNSKEY 256 3 8 (
                                AwEAAcAqV/Sd04tnuDt/BK1sbk6adEiK04Wcc/D+/zG2
  MSG SIZE rcvd: 1030
```





Multi-ZSK: Next Steps

Impact analysis (review of packet sizes)

Yeti experiment!





KSK Roll: ICANN Plan



- ICANN has a design team
- Returned feedback
- Initial plan novel characteristics
 - Strict adherence to timing in DPS
 - Fear of large packets
- Was high priority for Yeti
 - Now uncertain; waiting for design team output





KSK Roll: Double-DS

- Currently no KSK roll for Yeti
- First attempt failed
 - RFC 5011 holddown timer not respected
 - BIND 9 worked fine, in violation of RFC!
- Next attempt: run as experiment
- Related proposal: Un-DPS for Yeti?





Related: Hint Management

- New IANA root addresses?
 - One possible alternative to KSK roll
- Research on old-J root
 - Still receiving queries after 10 years
- Automate hints.txt updates?
 - Simple script
 - Include with software & distributions?





Related: Fragmentation

- Failed fragmentation very expensive
 - Timeout and retries for EDNS size probing
- Mukund Sivaraman's idea
 - DNS application-level fragmentation
 - Proof-of-concept proxy implementation
 - draft-muks-dns-message-fragments-00
 - Proxy already deployed alongside BII Yeti root
- DNS over DTLS has separate proposal



